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Transgenous Philosophy : Post-Humanism, Anthropotechnics and the Poetics of Natal 
Difference 
Sjoerd van Tuinen, Department of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam  
In this paper1 I investigate Peter Sloterdijk s relation to humanism, especially in its post-
Kantian sense of an ideology of Enlightenment based on anthropology. How does an author 
who writes after Nietzsche s biopolitical challenge of the Übermensch, Heidegger s 
ontological upgrading of the humanitas, Foucault s structuralist decentering of man, Derrida s 
deconstruction of anthropocentric discourse, and Deleuze & Guattari s machinic 
constructivism, relate to the ideology of emancipation through formation (Bildung), i.e. the 
anthropotechnics of reading and writing? What are the biopolitical insights of an anthropo-
phenomenology or an anthropology beyond humans ? (1999: 54) Can a positive 
understanding of humanity still be found in his work? 
Since the Summer of 1999, it has been impossible to find an answer to these questions 
without reference to the complex context of the affair with which it is customary to associate 
Sloterdijk s name. The occasion for Jürgen Habermas and other public intellectuals to ring the 
alarm bell was a philosophico-literary lecture given by Sloterdijk entitled Prescriptions for 
the Human Park. A Reply to Heidegger s Letter On Humanism.2 The contents of this text 
were wilfully and abusively interpreted as a programmatic series of statements on engineering 
the Übermensch. It soon attracted public attention all over Europe and definitively established 
Sloterdijk s name as one of the most significant, but also controversial, present-day 
continental philosophers. The bitter irony of all this attention, in itself an exceptional honour 
                                                
1
 I wish to thank Pieter Lemmens for his generous critique and several crucial references. 
2
 The lecture was presented at an international conference in Schloss Elmau on Jenseits des Seins, Exodus from 
Being, Philosophie nach Heidegger. For the German original: http://menschenpark.tripod.com. For a 
stylistically slightly revised version: 2001b: 302ff. For reasons that follow from my exposition, I prefer to 
translate the original Regeln with prescriptions rather than rules (as is usually done, see Sloterdijk 2009a) or 
regulations. Sloterdijk is not a moral(ist) philosopher. Although the term regulations could be justified from a 
systems theory perspective, his concept of Regeln also possesses strong juridical and medical connotations. The 
reader should keep this in mind both in the context of Sloterdijk s intertwining of de jure and de facto levels of 
argumentation, especially regarding Heidegger, and with regard to his immunological intentions and his strong 
solidarity with the tradition of Diogenes and Nietzsche, where the philosopher functions as physician of 
culture. (2001a: 9) 
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for a demanding philosophical paper, is that the subject of the original text  and this seems to 
have escaped humanists and their post-humanist antagonists alike was first and foremost 
precisely the question of what it means to write today, after the age of the book and the 
humanist ideology of its patient reading have come to an end. And despite, or, one is tempted 
to think, because of, all the attention this text has received since then, this essentially political 
question is still waiting to be taken seriously. 
In the first part of this chapter, I distinguish and briefly discuss two layers that 
together constitute the scandal: Firstly, Sloterdijk s actual text on humanism and formation in 
the age of genetic engineering, and secondly, the convergence of the scandal and the mass-
medial dynamics of normalization on the one hand and the hyper-morality and dogmatically 
conservative humanism of the last generation of Frankfurt School theorists on the other. The 
common term of these layers is the Kantian concept of anthropology and the critical reaction 
it has provoked in the works of Heidegger. After a discussion of their respective principles of 
difference, anthropological and ontological, I demonstrate how for Sloterdijk a non-
conservative, contemporary concept of formation depends on a third principle, which I 
propose to call natal difference. This not only paves the way for an explication of some 
aspects of Sloterdijk s complex relation to Heidegger, but also enables us to relate the main 
arguments from Prescriptions for the Human Park and its contexts to other critics of the 
humanist tradition such as Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze and, in some respects, Derrida. In 
recent decades, these authors have often been labelled anti-humanist. In the last two 
paragraphs of this paper, by contrast, I explore what a post-Heideggerian concept of formation 
could gain from Sloterdijk s post-humanist revaluation of anthropology. This is done by 
explicating two of Sloterdijk s hybrid conceptual inventions: homeotechniology and 
transgenous philosophy. (1999: 136)  
The Sloterdijk-Affair  
I. Prescriptions for the Human Park consists of a rather untimely philosophico-literary reply 
Sloterdijk himself calls it a notturno (2001a: 59) to Heidegger s letter On Humanism 
(1946), in which Sloterdijk gives a Nietzschean critique of Heidegger s concept of Lichtung 
in terms of biopolitics and the political meaning of writing. On both issues, it is argued that, 
despite himself, Heidegger occupies a humanist position. In short, Sloterdijk defines the 
essence and function of humanism through two related projects: first, that of the 
domestication and breeding of humans through anthropotechnics , and second, that of 
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friendship-constituting telecommunication in the medium of writing. 3 (2001a: 60; 2001b: 
302, 324) For a long time, both projects have been carried out in false innocence concerning 
the presupposed knowledge of what it is to be human, a knowledge which is in fact the result 
of a century old media conflict. (309) Even in Heidegger s critique of the humanist tradition 
this conflict remains unthought. Sloterdijk argues that the mediality of language itself remains 
unthought, thus implicitly adopting Derrida s critique that in Heidegger, writing is 
subordinate to the direct presence of Being in human speech. As a consequence, Heidegger is 
not critical enough of the disciplining and domesticating function of language as the house of 
Being . In Heidegger s pastoral discourse, the humanitas of humankind is directly related 
to man s ecstatic and decentred residence in language through which he shepherds the truth 
of Being. (127) This shepherding not only sets humankind free from its enslavement to the 
ontic, but also keeps it in servitude (hörig) to messages from Being, which is obeyed as the 
sole authority, without critically differentiating between the domesticating, emancipating 
and disinhibiting tendencies of this communication. 4 (316ff; c.r. 1988: 115ff; 1989: 254, 
260ff; 1999: 69f; 2001a: 33f)  
However, with the advent of post-literary media for biopolitical writing such as 
information technology or biotechnology the media conflict becomes manifest. The eviction 
from habitual humanistic appearance is the main logical event of the present, which one 
cannot elude by the flight into goodwill. (2001b: 212) To be sure, these technologies are 
themselves essentially a product of the humanist biopolitical project of forming human 
animals into civilized park animals through processes of (se)lection or reading (out) 
(2001b: 327), but Sloterdijk s point is that they have also internally eroded the classic 
strategies of manipulation and their media by exceeding any prescribed, idealistic model of 
the anthropos. Despite the fact that it was Heidegger who paved the way for the liberation 
from the anthropocentrism of language as poièsis, Sloterdijk therefore prefers Heidegger s 
first and last metaphysicians Plato, the theorist of genetic engineering in terms of 
shepherding, weaving and tending, and Nietzsche, the theorist of pastoral power and the 
Übermensch as the great challenge for the future for discussing the philosophical prehistory 
of contemporary technics of writing, which he calls anthropotechnics (329) or 
                                                
3
 Two understandings of the politics of friendship in the medium of writing that have been highly influential to 
Sloterdijk are Habermas s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962) and Derrida s Politics of 
Friendship (1988). 
4
 On the other hand, Sloterdijk s argument can be nuanced by referring to Heidegger, who in The Question 
Concerning Technology (1962, NY: Harper & Row, 25) subtly differentiates between listening (hören) and 
obeying (horchen), stating that it is exactly the functionary of technique who obeys the imperative (Anspruch) 
of the Gestell as challenge (Herausforderung), whereas he who shepherds Being only listens without 
indiscriminate obeying.   
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homeotechnology. (227) Their work presents humans as products immanent to an all but 
harmless process of breeding and formation by which homo natura engenders himself the 
disciplining and inscribing practices of all culture in its immeasurable historical extension 
which Plato calls paideia (the art on the child ) and Nietzsche the morality of custom 
(Sittlichkeit der Sitte). Their perspective is more relevant than ever, Sloterdijk claims, in 
today s post-humanist biopolitical situation that knows no sovereign (334) and from which a 
codex for anthropotechnics (329) is so dangerously lacking. In other words, these thinkers 
have explicitated 5 a problem that remains the Outside of all classical humanisms.  
II. In reaction to Sloterdijk s exit from humanism, Habermas sent a letter to various 
journalists of which, despite his initial denying its existence, a facsimile was later published 
in the Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung (16/09)  with instructions for publishing a number of 
rather sensational critiques of Sloterdijk s text. In the ensuing scandal, Sloterdijk was branded 
a philosophical parvenu, a popstar of thought, a fascistoid breeder of the Übermensch, a 
cynical ideologist of Grand Politics, but also simply the new Nietzsche. The result was a 
telling display of what it means to practice journalism and critical theory in a public sphere 
dominated by increasingly indifference-producing, non-friendship-constituting and therefore 
post-humanist mass media.6 After the first attacks in Der Spiegel and Die Zeit, many public 
intellectuals and academics such as Henri Atlan, Richard Dworkin, Manfred Frank and Ernst 
Tugendhat reacted in various other European periodicals to a text which was never meant for 
publication but of which pirate copies had been circulated by Habermas. These authors agreed 
on two points, namely 1) that Sloterdijk leaves the reader uncertainty about what he actually 
wanted to say and 2) that he had failed to first study the ethical and biological matter of his 
text. As representatives of the silent takeover of philosophy by professionalized ethics, 
they thus fell victim to a category mistake between ontology and democracy, assuming that 
they had before them an inferior text on moral rules instead of a post-Heideggerian 
meditiation on the essence of prescriptions. 7 
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 In his Tate lecture from 10 December 2005, Sloterdijk himself translates the German Explikation as 
explicitation : to unfold in the sense of explicitly making things and rendering things public. See: 
http://www.tate.org.uk/onlineevents/webcasts/spheres_of_action/. It combines Heidegger s poièsis (bringing 
forth into the open) with what Bruno Latour calls articulation and the explicitating violence of modern avant-
garde art. (2004: 208ff) 
6 See also Sloterdijk s philosophical reflection on the affair in terms of mediocrity , see Sloterdijk, 2000, Die 
Verachtung der Massen. Versuch über Kulturkämpfe in der modernen Gesellschaft, Franktfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, and Van Tuinen 2009b. 
7
 In his Offener Brief an Thomas Assheuer Sloterdijk indeed declares that what is ethically at stake is the border 
between legitimate medical optimization for individuals and illegitimate biopolitics for groups. (Die Zeit, 
37/1999, 35f) For some other bio-ethical remarks from the same period, see. 2001b: 202f, 229f, 232, 300f. 
However, in an interview with De Groene Amsterdammer (06/05/2000) he remarks that [w]e should first 
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If the affair is nonetheless instructive for a better understanding of Sloterdijk s text, 
this is not because of the thematic issues that were put at stake in the subsequent public debate 
than because of the way this debate is reminiscent of the discussion surrounding Habermas s 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1985) and the Habermas-Foucault controversies from 
the early 1980s. At that time Habermas and many disciples of the Frankfurt School had shown 
that for them any attack on humanism that intermingles critique and power as the inside and 
the outside of the same democratic process automatically comes down to anti-democratic 
sophistry and must be pilloried as such.8 But unlike what happened in the 1980s, when post-
Nietzschean philosophy became customarily known as obscure and relativistic, the false 
innocence of humanism about which Sloterdijk had warned in his lecture manifested itself 
perfectly clearly this time. Habermas, in spite of his being the theorist of democratic dialogue, 
refused to enter into one with Sloterdijk and preferred the path of indirect, false imputation. In 
response, Sloterdijk demonstrated the sham-liberal character of the still highly influential 
Frankfurt School by creating a metascandal through publishing two letters a decent 
humanistic practice in itself in Die Zeit, one of which is addressed to the journalist Thomas 
Assheuer, whom he addresses as an exemplary representative of journalistic alarmism, the 
other to Habermas, who is accused of Jacobinism and a social-liberal version of the 
dictatorship of morality. Combined, these letters constitute a vehement protest against the 
steady convergence of hypermorality and over-mediatization, or the decadence of literary and 
philosophical criticism and the spectacle of indignation. (cf. 1996: 114; 2000: 14) At the end 
of his second letter, Sloterdijk therefore proclaims as in fact he had already done in the 
Critique of Cynical Reason (1983) the death of Frankfurt Critical Theory: Critical theory 
is, on this second day of September, dead. She has long since been bedridden, the sullen old 
woman, now she has passed away completely. We will gather at the grave of an epoch, to take 
stock, but also to contemplate the end of an hypocrisy. Thinking means thanking, said 
Heidegger. I say, rather, that thinking means heaving a sigh of relief. 9 (Die Zeit, 37/1999, 35)   
Humanism from Anthropological to Ontological Difference  
                                                                                                                                                        
discuss ontology and logic, and only then ethics. Ethical norms don t change. Therefore, his actual ethical 
remarks on direct intervention in genetic text or scores are very few and his plea for a codex for 
anthropotechnics can only be understood as ironic. One may even wonder whether the challenges at issue can 
be processed in the mode of ethics at all, insofar as the term refers to the time-honoured connection between 
freedom, moral action and subjective autonomy.  
8 For a further elaboration of this parallel with the Foucault/Habermas-controversy, see Alliez 2001, who argues 
that the Sloterdijk-affair might also be called the Habermas case.  
9 For a full reconstruction and documentation of the affair, see Nennen 2003. 
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Both the significance of the affair and the joint venture of banalizing mass media dynamics 
and critical theory, however, far surpass German borders and idiosyncrasies, as is proven, for 
example, by the way in which a neo-Kantian such as Luc Ferry has tried to import the scandal 
into France and other countries. Sloterdijk himself therefore argues that humanism has 
progressively turned into the fundamentalism of Western culture. (2001a: 107, 114) 
Without much exaggeration, it can be said that the tradition in which he writes is a reaction to 
the rigid way in which the kantian ideas on Enlightenment, anthropology and politics have 
been institutionalized. Therefore, a genealogy of Sloterdijk s arguments and his position in 
the discursive field surrounding humanism should start with his discussion of Kant.  
In a sense, it is characteristic of Sloterdijk as an intellectual that he doesn t really read 
Kant: apart from a few exceptions he never really goes into critical discussion with other 
philosophers, but rather with their public effects. Nonetheless, implicit in his critique of the 
false innocence of humanism is a reinterpretation of the Kantian concept of Enlightenment, 
according to which the self-reading of the Reformation found its bourgeois translation in self-
thinking and self-knowledge. The critical project of determining the de jure conditions and 
limits of our possibilities is the philosophical attempt to manage our own capacity for 
delightenments such as uncritical exaggerations and inhuman projections.10 (2009b: 68-9) 
Anthropology teaches that man is a domestic animal condemned to self-breeding and self-
domestication. Yet the question remains how the potential subject of reason is de facto and 
with existential consequences brought to reason? Sloterdijk speaks of an unsublatable 
anthropological difference in post-Kantian philosophy. It is a difference between concept and 
reality in reason-possessing and reason-possessed beings, reminiscent of the difference 
between men as imago Dei and as sinful dissidents of God. Therefore, man is a finite or 
transitional subject, always on his way towards maturity. Biopolitically speaking, the great 
humanistic projects of Bildung are roads to subjective maturity in which natural desire and 
cultural law ultimately coincide. In these processes of formation, it is the task of the 
anthropologist, by addressing the question what is man?, to moderate between realistic and 
idealistic factions in the inner forum of modern subjects.  (1994: 273) 
Clearly, Sloterdijk s interpretation of Kant is highly indebted to Heidegger, who 
demonstrated that this obsession with the anthropos does not necessarily lead to the 
emancipation of humankind from repressive dogmas and immaturity, but may well bear 
                                                
10 For a discussion of the recurring concept of de-lightenment, see Oosterling 2007. On various strategies of 
Enlightenment in Sloterdijk, see Tuinen, Sjoerd van, Critique Beyond Resentment. An Introduction to Peter 
Sloterdijk s Jovial Modernity , in Cultural Politics, 03/2007, 275-306. 
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witness to an all too empirical ideal of what it is to be human. According to Heidegger, 
anthropology serves to legitimate man s unbridled will to power that constitutes the nihilistic 
essence of Modernity and its violent dialectics between subject and object. In nihilism, all that 
is (das Seiende) becomes objectified into things-at-hand in the manipulative power of 
subjects. If, through a total requisition (Aufforderung), anthropocentric representations and 
installations (Vor- und Aufstellungen) reduce the world to a reserve of commodities and raw 
materials, this goes most of all for emancipatory subjectivity itself. For it is the irony of the 
on-going Ge-stell that what installs itself is in fact what is most enframed (gestellt) and 
installed (bestellt). Modern humans only possess power and autonomy, Heidegger therefore 
argued, insofar as they have forgotten their proper essence. Subjectivity is always 
constituted by a forgetfulness of its own Being. Accordingly, it is only through 
commemorating ontological difference the difference between self-identitical beings and 
their Being that we can be in our rightful element. Our proper order, that by which the 
humanitas is distinguished from a mere animal rationale, is an ecstatic openness towards 
Being not the fake openness of a one-way road to an all-too-human maturity. As long as 
ontological difference remains unthought and is repressed by anthropological difference, no 
authentic being will be possible.  Hence Heidegger states that humankind can never be in full 
possession of nature or of its own essence, but only occupies a small patch of Enlightenment, 
a Lichtung, the horizons of which will always remain anthropologically underdetermined. 
And because it doesn t choose to stand in this Lichtung, but is de facto thrown into it by a 
movement that is not its de jure property, neither should it be in the centre of theory. Thus 
while Sartre could still emphasize that nous sommes sur un plan où il y a principalement 
l homme, Heidegger corrects this interpretation of existentialism in his letter On Humanism 
by declaring that nous sommes sur un plan où il y a principalement l Etre. 
However, Sloterdijk repeatedly stresses an important similarity between Heidegger s 
ontological project and post-Kantian subject-object dialectics. In both cases, an existing form 
of subjectivity is unmasked as not emancipatory enough, an estrangement that must be 
overcome. This is done in the name of a more proper, teleologically defined Bei-sich-Sein, 
respectively an essential auto- or onto-nomos, which ultimately turns out to be as Derrida 
has repeatedly demonstrated a metaphysically and thus morally informed theo-nomos. In 
post-Kantian dialectics, this order has been that of the essence of man, which is not yet fully 
realized; for Heidegger, it is the voice of Being, which is not yet fully heard. Both 
anthropological difference and ontological difference are conceived of as ultimate differences 
which, once appropriated, legitimate a denial of the actual state of affairs in the name of 
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something that is yet to come. Although Sloterdijk clearly subscribes to Heidegger s critique 
of anthropocentrism and throughout his work will search for principles of Gelassenheit 
instead of Kantian subjectivity, these cannot be based on a pre-subjective yielding to 
ontological difference either. Ultimately, both options are too conservative and dogmatic in 
that they depend on a preconceived, moral idea of what is proper to man. For Kant, one 
must treat every newborn as someone who desires to be, in the end, what he should be. 
Mature subjectivity is therefore primarily conceived as the idea of a retroactive authorization 
in favour of the educator. Nonetheless, it remains the fundamental contradiction of the 
human condition that maturity and freedom are expected of humans, although they didn t 
have the right to vote with regard to the most important question of their lives: whether they 
wanted to step into existence at all. (1994: 275) The same can be said of Heidegger, for 
whom the original Verfallenheit or Irre must be overcome in order to bring humanity into its 
proper relation of listening to the voice of Being and letting itself be tuned by it. Again, 
Sloterdijk s critique is reminiscent of Derrida s deconstructions of the teleology of 
anthropocentric discourse under the ambiguous banner of the ends of man. 11 Derrida s 
lesson was that a morality-free, or unprejudiced approach to humanity can only be based on 
a difference that can not be appropriated (2001c: 23): what is needed, therefore, is what 
Sloterdijk calls a new principle of difference, that is, an ontological difference without 
metaphysics. (1988: 96) As a way of overcoming modern anthropocentrism, Sloterdijk 
therefore proposes to think life from the perspective of its beginnings rather than its ends, for 
which he proposes the concepts of, firstly, natality, or coming-into-the-world, and, 
secondly, of assuming oneself.
 
Natal Difference and the Aesthetic Assumption of Oneself  
In The Human Condition (1958), Hannah Arendt developed her concept of natality as 
opposed to Heidegger s being-unto-death. (1989: 151f) For her, it was the key to a positive 
theory of man s finitude. Being born means traversing an Offenheit, entertaining an ecstatic 
relation with things and other people and being under constant pressure from the factic.12 
(1989: 151f; 1994: 280) For Sloterdijk, similarly, natality means that we are perpetually 
' arriving, extending and embedding ourselves in movements and relations in which we 
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 Derrida, Jacques, 1982, Margins of Philosophy, transl. A. Bass, Chicago/Sussex: The University of Chicago 
Press, 109ff. 
12
 Arendt, 1958, 10f, 157f, 170, 221f. 
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are not with ourselves (bei uns), but always already outside and away, engaged in 
technological, artistic, social and political affairs. (2001b: 42ff; 2004: 389ff) Sloterdijk 
therefore doesn t ask with Kant what is man? but rather with Heidegger where is man? and 
subscribes to both the latter s early definition that man is the way (das Weg) 13 (1994: 265) 
and his later definition that man inhabits the house of Being, 14 this house being understood 
as the language of poièsis through which man answers to the voice of Being and 
communicates (mitteilt) and imparts himself (sich austeilen) in ecstatic immanence. 15 
(1998: 631ff) However, for Sloterdijk this way is neither the linear one of a predetermined 
and necessary Bildung, nor a grim decisiveness or resigned yielding in the face of the 
unavoidable. Rather, it consists of an ongoing, complex moving into and moving out of the 
world, of constantly being reborn and beginning over again in concrete factual situations. 
(2001b: 42ff) 
Sloterdijk thus maintains Heidegger s crucial difference between an animal Umwelt 
and the specifically human Welt, but no longer defines it in terms of ontological difference. 
Instead I propose to call Sloterdijk s new principle of difference, drawing from an adjective 
that is biological as much as it is poetical, natal difference.16 It is difference conceived from a 
flipside perspective to that of ontological difference, similar to the way that natality is the 
flipside of being-unto-death and in Sphären III. Schäume bornness is proposed as the 
flipside of throwness. Natal difference is literally intergenerational, insofar as it is 
constituted by a generative process. It marks what has already been begun with a processual 
excess over itself. Due to this natal excess humans are never completely with themselves (bei 
sich); yet neither could they be and that s why Sloterdijk calls his own work an anthropo-
monstrology (2004: 864): an anthropology of natal difference.  
As a consequence, coming-into-the-world involves a falling out of the animal Umwelt, 
but this is not a negative a priori of the human condition, like estrangement or Verfallenheit. 
Rather, it is the sign of an original excess or freedom that is the quintessence of human life. 
Due to this excess, even in poetical language humans are never completely at home but rather 
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 Cf. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie, S. 323. 
14
 Heidegger, 2000, 53. 
15
 Sloterdijk also uses other verbs such as sich aussetzen, sich kompromittieren, sich  vorgeben, sich freigeben 
and sich ausgeben to describe this transsubjective type of communication. Sloterdijk, 1988: 22ff; 2001b: 37, 99; 
2001c: 46ff. 
16
 The concepts of Umwelt, Welt and Weltoffenheit originate in the work of Jakob von Uexküll and in the 
classic philosophical anthropology of the 1920s, especially Max Scheler, Arnold Gehlen, Adolf Portmann, 
Helmuth Plessner and Louis Bolk. For each of them, having fallen out of the environment and being-in-the-
world both mean being in an extra-uterine scene or horizon within which one must always be on the lookout for 
more than the totality of extant things or that have hitherto appeared. (2001b: 157, 161f, 204f; 2004: 391) 
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the product of a hyper-birth (321) or permanent crisis, which for two-and-a-half thousand 
years has been called upbringing. (46) As a consequence, being-born doesn t simply equal 
moving into the house of Being; rather, it is a move to what lies beyond, namely a whole 
Menschenpark, a biopolitical situatedness in which humans constantly have to assume 
themselves (sich übernehmen).17  
Together with natality, the concept of assuming oneself refers to the full assumption of 
one s own beginning, the result of which is one s being-there or Da-sein, instead of one s end. 
(1994: 267ff) It goes back to Sloterdijk s Frankfurt lectures called Zur Welt kommen zur 
Sprache kommen from 1988, in which birth is conceived as the original scene for post-
Heideggerian whether poetical, philosophical, technological or political forms of 
Gelassenheit, which I propose to translate with the word relief.18 Rather than offering an 
overhasty metaphysical interpretation of the critical principle of Gelassenheit from the 
perspective of our utopian or thanatopian ends, Enlightenment and Gelassenheit in terms of 
birth seek utopia in the unprejudicedness of the as yet of being-born. (1989: 151f) This 
shift from yielding to relief owes more to Nietzsche than to Heidegger and is rooted in a non-
trivial interpretation of Nietzsche s become who you are: a happy positivism according to 
which assuming oneself means assuming responsibility for all the consequences that follow 
from the fact that one is. (1988: 163; 1994: 281) Assuming oneself does not depend on a 
negation of the factual in the name of a transcendent principle of difference an 
anthropological shortcoming or an onto-phenomenological reduction from an actual state of 
affairs but remains true to the complexity of the world in a biopositive, non-illusionary but 
indecipherable, because foetal, reservation of the world (Weltvorbehalt). (1988: 94) It 
implies a Dionysian rather than phenomenological Gelassenheit that starts out from the 
primary too much of an ecstatic immanence, relieved of the economy of the necessary 
and the proper. (1988: 22ff; 2001c: 50; 2005a: 121f) About this Gelassenheit, Sloterdijk 
writes: insofar as this mode of existence is still attainable for grown-up, conflict-hardened 
subjects, then only if they let themselves get involved in the world as in a stream of 
proceeding birth. (1994: 292) Finally, it is a therapeutic concept, as long as one understands 
                                                
17 For Heidegger s use of the concept of sich übernehmen, which comes very close to that of Sloterdijk, see his 
Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vittorio Klostermann, 1994, 297): Gleichwohl stehen Dasein und Mensch in einem 
wesentlichen Bezug, sofern das Da-sein den Grund der Moglichkeit des kunftigen Menschseins bedeutet und der 
Mensch kunftig ist, indem er das Da zu sein ubernimmt ... .
18 The term relief combines the Kantian and Asian concepts of Enlightenment, the Heideggerian concepts of 
Gelassenheit and Lichtung, the anti-philosophical frivolity (Leichtsinn) of Diogenes, Luhmann s cybernetical 
irony (2001b: 126), the Nietzschean escape from morality and ressentiment, technological exoneration 
(Entlastung) and economic de-scarcification (Entknappung) in a therapeutic concept that is arguably the main 
theme of all of Sloterdijk s work.  
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by therapy the endeavour to set free the flow of pre-predicative affirmations towards a 
reflected acceptance (Einwilligung) in self-designed life. 19 (1994: 292f) Therapy, then, is the 
attempt, mediated and facilitated by anthropotechnics, to reach for the generative pole of 
one s own life, to catch up with and overcome oneself, in other words, to become who you 
are. Already early on in his career, Sloterdijk describes the task of poets to transform what 
Cioran called the absolute disadvantage [ with being born svt] into the most euphoric of all 
advantages. 20 
After anthropological difference and ontological difference, the self-assumption of 
birth as natal difference is a third way of relating to man s finitude with far-reaching 
consequences for our ecological, social and, as we shall see, genetic self-understanding. 
(2001a: 111f) Nietzsche gave us an understanding of Modernity as the impossibility of 
breeding individuals to an end. (2010: 113) But if, for him, humankind is the nicht-
festgestellte Tier, the same goes for the world in which it lives, and any preconceived 
conformity between youth and world is precluded. Therefore, Sloterdijk argues, Nietzsche is 
the great psychagogist of Modernity, who wanted to actively create new life forms out of 
the existing materials of talent and character and first made a modern transition from the 
priority of self-knowledge to that of self-realization which is so typical of our culture of life-
long learning. In fact, the human park has always been the scene of a reformatting crisis in 
human essence. But it is Nietzsche, that great thinker of birth, who liberated this crisis from 
its moral overtones. (45ff) If humans are the products of a process of self-formation, and if 
aesthetics rather than morality is the discipline of forms, then he set free an understanding of 
Bildung that would later gain currency as the aesthetics of the self. Such an aesthetics can 
function as a strategy of emancipation or enlightenment that is neither a priori suspicious of 
being intimately related to existing power relations nor yields to retroactive subjectivist 
authorizations. Rather, we should understand self-assumption in such a way that no 
metaphysics of I-ness has to be presupposed. (1988: 121) Hence, for Sloterdijk, natality is 
opposed to the reactionary, which he describes as the mindset according to which it is better 
to serve an empty form as long as it has the power to impose itself than to lose oneself in the 
freedom of formlessness and of sheer experiment. (711) Instead, it allows for an informal 
                                                
19 By contrast, Ansell-Pearson (2009) criticizes Sloterdijk s early reading of Nietzsche insofar as it does not 
make a difference between paideia and therapeia, or between an affirmative therapy that leads to amor fati in the 
form of a transfiguration of the hard school of life into sovereign individuals on the one hand and an 
anthropotechnical improvement or healing of patients of existence on the other. Ansell-Pearson 2009. 
20 (1988: 138) 
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thought which includes poetical philosophies and the thought that is invested in 
artworks. (2001a: 354; 2001b: 224, 228)  
Homeotechnology and Poièsis  
For Sloterdijk, the great merit of the formula coming-into-the-world is that it diminishes or 
even elides Heidegger s famous technophobia and provincialism, both directly related to his 
resistance to anthropology. (2001b: 44) According to the latter s onto-phenomenological 
reduction of the ontic, the modern age of technology and globalization constitutes the summit 
of more than two thousand years of nihilistic forgetfulness of Being. A Turn (Kehre) towards 
Being, understood as the reversion (Umkehr) to, or with Sloterdijk the phenomenological 
rendition of the modern, vertical movement of revolution (2001: 60ff) in the history of 
Being, could never be the work of humans since work is always active and 
anthropomorphic and belongs to the Ge-stell  but only an Einkehr of Being itself. Ultimately, 
this leads to Heidegger s famous conclusion that only a God can still save us. (23/1976, 
193ff) Unsurprisingly, Sloterdijk is not pressed for such a salvation. Such an assessment 
would leave us both in sheer denial of the world we live in today and empty-handed in the 
face of a potentially dangerous future. (1987b: 63ff; 2001a: 105; 2001b: 300) In his collection 
of essays on Heidegger, Nicht gerettet. Versuche nach Heidegger (2001), clearly composed as 
a contextualization of Prescriptions for the Human Park21, he never fails to reproach 
Heidegger for having missed the appointment with Modernity. However, his main problem 
with phenomenology is no different from his reproach to most modern theory, especially in its 
young Hegelian and phenomenological variants, and lies in what he repeatedly refers to by 
employing Luhmann s concept of the reduction of complexity. (2001a 47, 352; 2001b: 80) 
Through a literal, stubborn, (1988: 9), kinetic (1989: 260, 2001b: 29ff) and 
historical or evolutionary (7) reading of Heidegger s de jure concept of Lichtung, 
Sloterdijk argues that we are already dealing with the product of a Leichtung. (1989: 260) 
Lichtung and anthropogenesis are two expressions for the same historical relief-phenomenon. 
(2001b: 159f) The rather perverse interest of this interpretation lies in the fact that it paves the 
way for an ontic history of ontological difference, without causing oneself to be misled by 
the contemptuous note of sworn-in Heideggerians, that something merely ontic is abused for 
determining something ontological. And what if precisely such a determination depended on a 
                                                
21 Especially the essay Die Domestikation des Seins. Die Verdeutlichung der Lichtung. (2001b: 142ff) 
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reversal through which contemplative philosophy could regain the lost connection with the 
investigative cultural sciences? (2001b: 159f) For Sloterdijk, a radical historical 
anthropology and an ontic revision of the concept of Lichtung are justified by the fact that 
today s being-in-the-world has long been explicitated as a product of industrialisation, as a 
hybrid of technology and anthropology. In fact, he argues that the genetic and information 
revolutions  mean that the drama of anthropology has only just begun. (2001b: 44) 
In a post-Heideggerian, historical anthropology the concept of humanity doesn t refer 
to an object of knowledge but to a container concept that contains incalculable 
complexities. (2001b: 157) Humans constitute a medium or stage, like an eye through 
which Dionysus observes himself, (1990: 82) on which can appear not beings, but 
becomings or events without final aim. (2004: 177f) It is true that, in today s new 
technologies and digital interfaces, modern transcendental subjectivity reformatted into that 
of the observed observer (2001b: 129) recurs more strongly than ever. But it is precisely 
the continuation of phenomenology itself which demands a cybernetics or systems theory that 
grasps subjectivity beyond ego and will, (1990: 82) in a historical compromise between 
cybernetics and personalism. (2001b: 223) Contrary to Heidegger s analysis of the poverty 
of modern subjectivity in its role of feedback system of technology, Sloterdijk appreciates 
cybernetics for introducing information as a third term between subject and object, thus 
introducing a mechanical aspect into reflexivity. (2004: 740f) It is precisely from a cybernetic 
perspective that it is impossible to reduce ourselves to mere ontic nature when we speculate, 
for example, about cloning. Rather, because the human genome has both a material aspect (it 
doesn t exist without the molecular structure of DNA) and an aspect of intelligence (in 
interaction with other intracellular components, it steers and regulates ontogenetic routes and 
contains information that commands the synthesis of proteins), genetics explicitates the 
importance of informational technology22 in such a way that both humans and nature now 
                                                
22
 Although Sloterdijk assumes that genes contain information, the ontological quality of information in genetics 
is still highly controversial. For some time now, biology has denied the gene the possession of information (and 
thus also informational preformism) that could generate phenotypes by itself. However, in the post-genomic 
age, information seems to regain its matter organizing quality from a more holistic, systems biology perspective 
in which the organism is no longer understood as a product of its genes, but as an autonomous entity, assigning 
informational content to the genome itself, the genome being only one of the subsystems of a biosystem; the 
steady growth of complexity in the living world can be understood as resulting from more intensive deployments 
by organisms of their genomic resources; see also: Marc W. Kirschner & John C. Gerhart, The Plausibility of 
Life. Resolving Darwin's Dilemma, Yale University Press, 2005. For a critical discussion of the concept of 
information in biology from a developmental systems perspective: Lenny Moss s What Genes Can t Do, 2004, 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; for an explanation of how information emerges with the ontogenetical process 
of the organism: Susan Oyama s The ontogeny of information, 2000, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Although Sloterdijk s understanding of the gene seems to be thoroughly informationist, it is perhaps important to 
note that his concept of information as tertium datur between man and nature is inspired more by Gotthard 
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appear as its derived variables.23 (2001b: 218) In other words, a modern sense of relief is 
expressed in a constructivism which treats beings not as Bestand, enframed and domesticated 
in a world picture, but as events unfolding in an ongoing generative process. (2001b: 206; 
2004: 214) 
For this reconciliation of Gelassenheit and technology, Sloterdijk following the 
founder of homeopathy, Samuel Hahnemann extends his earlier concept of self- 
experiment (1996: 13f; 2001a: 7ff) and proposes the concept of homeotechnology, (227) 
the technology used for operating on materials that are of the same ontological quality as the 
operator. It is contrasted with allotechnology, the contranatural or estranged technology 
that treats materials as being of a different ontological quality. The latter, corresponding to 
Heidegger s conception of technology, determines Western metaphysics from Athens to 
Hiroshima. (2001b: 214, 275ff) However, technologies and modes of production such as 
genetics, artificial intelligence, neurosciences and robotics depend ever less on one-way 
operations instrumental to an enframing will to power. Rather, they increasingly depend on a 
new alliance with the natural worker (Naturarbeiter) (2005a: 45) and regenerative 
energies. (363f) They allow for both humans and their creations to take part in the same 
continuum of what Heidegger calls bringing-forth-into-the-open (Entbergen). (2001b: 153) 
Heidegger s post-metaphysical concept of poièsis (and also Maturana s and Varela s post-
phenomenological concept of autopoièsis) bear witness to the fact that Gelassenheit doesn t 
have to be a patient shepherding of life, but can also be an active bringing forth. In fact, it 
implies a cybernetic transition in the understanding of the self from a priori-regulation to a 
posteriori-regulation and replaces Heidegger s God with the capacity of creating natures.
(2004: 870) However, this openness calls for a complex understanding of technology, in 
which such a mode of production could want nothing except what the things themselves 
are from themselves or can become from themselves all material would then be 
understood and operated upon from its proper obstinacy (Eigensinnigkeit). (1987b: 81; 1989: 
148f; 2001a: 29, 82, 330f; 2001b: 53, 227)  
                                                                                                                                                        
Günther s cybernetics than by genetics and that his interest in process ontology implies a non-substantialist, 
holistic understanding of genes as well. For a Foucault-inspired history of the relation between autopoièsis and 
informationism: Who wrote the book of life? by Lily Kay, 2000, Chicago/London: Stanford University Press. 
23
 An important source for Sloterdijk for this post-Hegelian concept of information is Gotthard Günther s Das 
Bewusstsein der Maschinen (1963, Baden-Baden/Krefeld: Agis-Verlag) and the difference made by the latter 
between classic and transclassic technology. This difference seems to coincide with a development in 
cybernetics from Wiener s original interest in programs operating through negative feedback with reference to 
an external target towards the theories of self-organisation and circular causality developed by authors such as 
Varela or Luhmann. 
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Sloterdijk illustrates this obstinacy or proper nature (Eigennatur) (226), comparable 
perhaps to what in aesthetics is called mediumspecificity, with an example from Spinoza: If, 
for example, I say that I have the right to do whatever I like with this table, I am hardly likely 
to mean that I have the right to make this table eat grass. 24 We really are the quasi-demiurgic 
species that artificially manipulates nature. But this is only possible through the practice of 
homeotechnology that makes nature and humans take part in the same poetical continuum. 
Combined, the gynaecologization of Heidegger s critique of technology towards an 
understanding of natal difference and the cybernetic interpretation of subjectivity offer a 
principle of natural or natal difference that puts Gelassenheit back into nature, making the 
real history of the Lichtung described above coincide with the natural history of 
Gelassenheit. (159; c.r. 1993: 19) 
What is most original in Sloterdijk s reading of Heidegger is therefore the way in 
which he translates phenomenology into a veritable constructivism. The philosophical 
importance of his concept of homeotechnology lies in his attempt to make Heidegger s poièsis 
converge with Spinoza s natura naturans, according to which nature is an autoplastic self-
constructing hypermachine. (2001a: 115, 222; 2004: 494) It is typical of a constructivist 
approach to technology that humanity is never bei sich, but constantly reconstructing its 
house of Being. Consider the following example: if Dolly is no longer a sheep born from 
sheep, then neither would the homo clonatus be a human born from humans. Yet, at the same 
time, he is precisely a human-made human, or homunculus. (2001a: 108, 2001b: 166, 215) At 
work here is a technology mediated, intergenerational, or natal difference, which, by 
differentiating nature into a process with two sides one of production, natura naturans, and 
one of its products, natura naturata frees the creative force of life from its fixation on the 
side of the produced. Firstly, this difference forces us to understand technology as a 
production process in which there is no absolute difference between nature and human 
technology. Secondly, it disallows us to reduce the essence of life to the prescriptive laws of 
what actually exists or to disconnect it from the laws of self-transgressing becoming. Thirdly, 
it makes us realize that life, no matter whether it is defined biologically, ecologically, or 
morally, cannot be restricted to the domain of an essentialistically defined humanity. Man s 
relation to technology may be uncanny (unheimlich), but this uncanniness is also a positive 
opportunity for new forms of life, now understood as an affair that has always already begun 
outside the privileged domain of the human (cf. Chancen im Ungeheuren): the innate 
                                                
24
 Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus, IV, 4, cited in 2001b: 227. 
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negativity of the human position towards nature can turn into a positivity, if humans 
themselves, spoken figuratively, arrive at the other side sufficiently enough more 
precisely, on the other side of naturating. (2001b: 294) 
Homeotechnology is, for Sloterdijk, not merely an over-excited speculation in the 
style of late-romantic philosophy of nature or alchemical or kabbalistic dreams, but the 
implicit Leitmotiv of all modern technosciences. Moreover, once natura naturans becomes a 
cultural drama (1989: 154f; 2004: 194), he argues, the concept of homeotechnology might 
well deliver the matrix of a humanism after humanism. (2001b: 226ff) Or as he puts it in 
Nicht gerettet: One has to become a cybernetician to remain a humanist. (365) We are not 
so much ontologists, but second order constructors of machines, second engineers. (2004: 
295f) Therefore, as Sloterdijk paraphrases Heidegger, nous sommes sur un plan où il y a 
principalement la technique .25 (2001b: 225) If humans are becoming more and more self-
operable and are attaining more and more the active side of (se)lection, then they cannot 
be reduced to a raw subject (Rohsubjekt); they must also be understood in their capacity of 
co-producer[s] and in extreme cases as intelligence accelerator[s]. (293) From the 
perspective of historical anthropology, humankind is, in Heideggerian terms, a regional 
possibility of clearing (Lichtung) and a local energy of gathering (Sammlung), or, more 
Foucaultian, a gathering place of truth and power, but, as Sloterdijk emphasizes, it is no 
gatherer of everything. (2001b: 222f) This means that it cannot and must not choose between 
being itself and not being itself. Humans consort with themselves like a surgeon with his 
patients. Today, I can no longer be myself authentically as long as I abstract myself from my 
potential operator. (2004: 73) Once we convert ourselves from subject to project, as Vilèm 
Flusser would have said, we are able to see how the original, pre-Kantian project of raising 
the potentiality of humans can be continued.26   
Writing after the Ends of Book and Man 
                                                
25 The term plane of technique also appears in Baudrillard s The System of Objects, 2005,  London: Verso, 4. If 
today s conservative neo-Kantian strands of thought and phenomenology are being overrun by an integral 
technological naturalism, this is not only because they are progressively unable to handle the new technological 
and informational givens but also because, ultimately, reduction and distance (2001b: 53) cannot conceal how 
the question of Being poses itself through questions of power and technique. (2001a: 117f; 2004: 177) 
26
 One more remark on the ethical consequences of this new ontology (cf. footnote 7): Humans, for Sloterdijk, 
don t inhabit a single house of Being as their proper element, but are amphibian constructivists accessing a 
plurality of potential elements or atmospheres. (2001b: 156, 222, 385; 2004: 37) If a post-phenomenological 
concept of poièsis should be retained, then, in order to do justice to the complexity of our world, it will have to 
be supplemented with a pluralistic ontology, and, secondarily, with a polyvalent morality which remains 
immanent to a process of continual de- and re-Interessierung . (2004: 411) In order for such a morality to 
exist, a complex concept of Bildung as mediator between engineers and non-engineers, surgeons and non-
surgeons, entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, would be valuable. (2001b: 358) 
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The concepts of natality and homeotechnology have led Sloterdijk to a definition of the homo 
humanus as a medial inter-being (Zwischenwesen). Let us now return to the problem of 
biopolitics. For a reactionary humanist, Sloterdijk summarizes, growing up means 
internalization of the victim and hypertrophy of the sense of reality at the expense of the 
sense of possibility. (2004: 739) But, he asks, isn t the main event of anthropogenesis 
rather the conquest of childhood and of a structural neoteny : the retention, well into 
maturity, of traits previously and in other species seen only in juveniles? (1988: 94; 2004: 
756f) In a sense, therefore, the ethical question posed by anthropology is how to remain a 
relatively unformed subject of experimentation and healthy naivety. 
So far, I have shown how, for Sloterdijk, a relief from a heavily laden understanding 
of growing up depends on a principle of difference that doesn t approach difference from the 
side where it is already established, but from its processual, productive, performative side. In 
a time when human autonomy and maturity comes to be conditioned less by humanist 
ideology and more and more by science and technology, such a change of sides is nothing less 
than urgent. Until now, we have focussed on biotechnology as one possible medium in which 
natal difference is at work. This was justifiable because the concept of anthropotechnics was 
the main cause of misinterpretation in the Sloterdijk affair and because for Sloterdijk the 
interference of information mechanisms in subjectivity is the most spectacular in genetics. 
However, once it is put back in its Heideggerian context, anthropotechnics functions as the 
theorem of an historical anthropology according to which the human condition is 
fundamentally a product and can only be understood by analyzing its historically varying 
modes and relations of production. (2001b: 152) Anthropotechnics in this sense must be 
understood as a new configuration of ontology and anthropology beyond Heidegger s critical 
opposition of technology and poetry. For Sloterdijk, it refers to all media by which humans 
are inscribed, coded or marked, especially in a time when not only the life sciences, but also 
mass media and informatization have pushed aside the book as the privileged medium of 
human formation. This brings us back to a key issue of anthropo-technical biopolitics: the 
nature of writing, or the writing of (human) nature, and the critical search for the possibility of 
beginning to write anew. 
The first lesson of historical anthropology, in which natality and (self-)writing 
converge in a definition of homo humanus as techno-poetical domestic animals, is that the 
house of Being has always been a phenomenon of transference, translation and transmission 
(Übertragung). (2004: 391f; 1998: 14, 45, 56-8) This was already intuited by Heidegger, 
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when he famously quoted Hölderlin s: Full of merit, yet poetically, man dwells on this 
earth. 27 However, according to Sloterdijk s immunological interpretation, this poetics 
(dichten) not only refers to living poetically and ecstatically, but also to an anthropo-
immunological process of sealing or closing off a domestic lifeworld by transferring the 
homely onto the uncanny. Coming-into-the-world involves a coming-into-language that 
transfers the original anthropogenetic process onto new Lichtungen by befriending the 
monstrous Outside or the inhuman. And it is not only poetry; language in general, 
including that of technology, is a general organon of translation and of becoming friends 
with the world. (2001b: 210, 312ff) If there is reason to question the humanist legacy today, 
this not so much because the house of Being crumbles under technological installations, but 
because nobody knows what this house will look like after its deconstruction, since now 
even its foundation, the liaison between the culture of writing and human formation, is being 
redesigned. The immunological capacity of language is being progressively overburdened 
one could say that we are being progressively turned inside out (Sloterdijk uses both 
umgestülpt and ausgestülpt), insofar as cybernetics constructs uncanny analogies of 
subjectivity by externalizing us in information. Speaking and writing in the age of digital 
codes and genetic transcriptions no longer have any kind of homely sense; the scriptural 
compositions (Schriftsätze) of technology develop outside of translation and no longer 
generate homifications (Anheimelungen) nor befriend the outside. On the contrary, they widen 
the range of the exterior and the unassimilatable. 28 (2001b: 213) 
An intuition of this radical alteration in the essence of writing can of course already be 
found in the untimely writing of Nietzsche for a people to come and in Heidegger, who in 
his letter On Humanism  hence right after the end of WWII, when old humanist conservatism 
seemed the sole guarantee against further inhuman excesses and German book shops were 
flooded with new editions of Goethe and Schiller writes that in the age of technology die 
Heimatlosigkeit ist ein Weltschicksal. 29 For Sloterdijk, both Nietzsche and Heidegger are 
therefore experimental authors, writing for a non-existent, post-humanist public, for the 
future, uncertain of whether they will ever find a reader able to understand its message. They 
perform operations in what is unproven (im Unerwiesenen) and attempt to think beyond 
one s own age. 30 (326) However, in order to make it possible for Sloterdijk to define writing 
                                                
27
 Heidegger, 2000, 50. 
28 See also: Roof, Judith, 2007, The Poetics of DNA, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota UP. 
29
 Heidegger, 2000, 30. 
30 Sloterdijk defines his work as a nicht-festgestellte anthropology (2004: 864), as a series of attempts to 
collect a knowledge that is pushed away from normalisation, yet nonetheless consolidated and inscribed 
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in terms of natal difference, it took Foucault and Deleuze s thought of the Outside and 
Derrida s deconstructions of Heidegger s anthropomorphisms to liberate this search for 
relief from Heidegger s pre-modern fixation on ontological difference. To conclude I 
therefore propose to relate Sloterdijk s principle of natal difference as a noble weakness and 
a local energy of poetics and the simple exposure towards the incommensurable (2001b: 
223) to a principle of differance that can be found in the works of these French authors, 
especially in Derrida s concept of writing as anti-genealogical or to use a concept of 
Sloterdijk which unfortunately remains undefined in his works, transgenous writing. (1999: 
136) 
Even if Sloterdijk hardly ever refers to Derrida,31 a Derridean understanding of writing 
lies at the basis of his own concept of poièsis. Already in his early Zur Welt kommen zur 
Sprache kommen (1988), which has the explicit aim of liberating Heidegger s thought in a 
language where it would be more right than in its own (1988: 10; 2001b: 165), he has 
conducted a thought experiment in which each human embodies a syllable, but is unable to 
read himself because he doesn t possess an organ for direct self-perception. Rather, what 
marshals these living syllables, concealed to themselves, onto the track of their own sounds, is 
writing. (13ff) Because writing is like an infinite book, without a first or last page, Sloterdijk 
argues that the distinction between literature and life is difficult to make.32 (36) Humans are 
world constituting animals and insofar as this comes down to gathering writing to further the 
world s text, poetry is analogous to existence. (2001b: 204) The lesson of this experiment is 
that living is a medial, pre-subjective and pre-objective affair: one comes into the world by 
communicating oneself, by translating the ecstasis into enstasis (210), but through and before 
this communicating one is already dispersed over and communicated by others. (1988: 22ff, 
2001c: 46ff) One only assumes oneself by exposing oneself or inscribing oneself in the 
having-already-begun of a pre-poetic text of life (Lebenstext) (1988: 12) or even genetic 
                                                                                                                                                        
(hineingeschriebenes Wissen), and to send it to later generations in the form of a message in a bottle, (2001a: 
281f) or as the art of creating words that point out the horizon on board reality. (1994: 60) He privileges the 
format of the essay, which is a driving school for intelligence in a world in which the traffic rules between the 
participants are being developed only whilst driving and a decision-making process in order to render 
undetermined textual process readable in finite time (1993b: 20). In an interview with Éric Alliez, Sloterdijk 
reflects that [a]s a philosophical writer who s defined the essay as a definitive form of the provisional, I have in 
my sights an essayistic notion of philosophy of the highest possible level. (Alliez 2007) 
31
 An exception is Derrida, an Egyptian:  
32 The gap or difference in the beginning of every self-conscious life and in the self-interpretation of life was 
the subject of Sloterdijk s dissertation, Literatur und Lebenserfahrung, a study of autobiographical writing in the 
Weimar Republic initially inspired by Dilthey s hermeneutics but concluding with an argument against 
autobiography in favour of the theory of subject-transgressing found in Heidegger and Gadamer. (1978, c.r. 
1988: 41ff; 1984: 240ff). 
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text . 33 (2001b: 202) These textual traces are like a material, exogenous unconsciousness, 
marked by existential tatooings, which no upbringing can cover completely and no 
(humanistic) conversation can hide. 34 (1988: 16) If every translation in the asymmetry of 
generations what we are used to calling the tra-dition has the character of a hostage 
taking, a kind of intergenerational passivity inseparable from an unavoidable violence, then, 
Sloterdijk wonders, wasn t it indeed the moral scandal of the old teleological praxis of 
Enlightenment humanism through breeding, domestication and ultimately, humanization, that 
it used in-between generations only as a means towards the emancipation of later generations, 
instead of as an end in themselves?35 By contrast, he holds that only when the primary 
inscription is put to play, defined as a relief of this natural violence, does poièsis become 
possible.36 (19) Poièsis depends on an escape from the economy of the necessary or the 
probable (1987b: 109ff): Regenerating oneself or assuming oneself is to begin anew, to 
lose time and again the key that only yesterday was certain to open the locks; it means to go 
back before what we are already able to do, to reveal the tatooings that are monotonously 
carved into the meaningless flesh.  (1988: 23)   
Transgenous Philosophy  
With today s technologies of writing, these poetical concepts of beginning, play and 
experiment gain importance. If genes, to pick up the extreme example once more, are like a 
chain letter through generations, then the disappearance of pre-biotechnological modes of 
                                                
33 Another problematic metaphor, cf. footnote 27. Again, one could argue in Sloterdijk s defense that a gene, just 
like a syllable, is nothing in itself and remains in need of an on-going organization into networks. 
34
 This approach of information and communication mnemotechnologies as spiritual technologies, situated in the 
field of what Plato called the hypomnémata and what Foucault called the technique of the writing of the self,  is 
also taken by for example Bernard Stiegler, see: http://www.arsindustrialis.org/manifeste. See also Du musst 
Dein Leben ändern, which appeared two years after this text was first written and of which Sloterdijk stresses 
that, for him as for Nietzsche, anthropotechnics concerns your life (dein Leben) and not life (das Leben) 
(2008: 23): For Nietzsche despite occasional talk of breeding  there is no eugenics, not more, at least, than 
is included in the recommendation to choose a partner in good light and with intact self-respect. All the rest 
pertains to dressage, discipline, education and self-design the Übermensch implies not a biological, but an 
artistic  not to say acrobatic program. (2008: 178) 
35 From this perspective, the end of the book is indeed most dramatic: If nowadays Western humans no longer 
want to be emancipated, but insured; if insurance is humanism minus the culture of books; (2001b: 150) if, our 
society is taken hostage by its own advanced technologies; (151) then [t]he connection between capitalism 
and Protestantism as it was discovered by Max Weber solidifies before our eyes into the alliance of 
biotechnology and the market mentality. (300) 
36 Human modes of behaviour can be considered as relieved if, in order to be carried out, they require neither 
complete seriousness nor any ultimate commitment from the party performing the action. 
(http://www.eu2006.at/includes/Download_Dokumente/2003TourismSloterdijkEN.pdf) (c.r. 2001b: 70f, 2004: 
708, 722, 725) Ultimately, a post-human human would therefore be a new homo ludens: advanced biotechnics 
and brain technics draw on a sophisticated, cooperative subject that plays with itself and that forms itself in 
contact with complex texts and over-complex contexts. (2001b: 231) 
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(se)lection and (pre-)scription in favour of a genetic technology that favours disseminative, 
transversal or lateral37 connections over linear ones, demands by itself a transgenous 38 
approach to writing and self-(se)lection.39 The same can be said of the marginalization of the 
book by hypertext and ever more interactive or, following i ek, interpassive media of 
(in)formative writing. In terms of breeding and domestication, genetic engineering no longer 
depends on in-between generations because it has direct access to its results, and the most 
shocking moment of the old strategies of formation the intergenerational elimination of 
unwanted exemplars therefore disappears. (2001a: 131) This is what Sloterdijk refers to 
when he argues that more and more we attain the active side of reproduction. Of course, this 
doesn t take away the biopolitical question of (se)lection, but at least puts it in more 
contemporary terms. Thus, it allows for a relief from over-optimistic expectations of human 
subjectivity à la Habermas and for a post-subjective or post-author-centred grammar to 
appear: Whereas the centered subject is the effect of a grammatical system that harasses to 
death the living consciousness between Thou shalt and I want, the decentered subject 
would perhaps be the first to have the right to say in reference to itself: I am. (1990: 82) Such 
a subject is no longer interested in what is his proper end, because in transgenous writing, 
there can be no private property of histories but only a presentation of transmitted wisdom 
and no plagiarism because there is no hierarchic difference between originals and copies in 
the flow of  traditions. 40  (1987b: 99f) 
When Sloterdijk proposes a transgenous concept such as Nietzsche s Übermensch in 
order to develop a more relieved attitude towards the asymmetric violence of tradition, this is 
not to deny that the new technologies of writing are deeply embedded in social discourses and 
in the symbolic operations of the sciences. Nonetheless, they do offer a critical relief when 
compared to the more dogmatic and morally legitimating anthropological and ontological 
                                                
37
 After observing that genetics and terrorism, procreation and evil, alternate as the most topical issue in the 
media, Sloterdijk explains in his essay Von terror und von Genen how both genes and terrorism offend us 
laterally; that is, from a pre-subjective, intimate environment. For an in-depth discussion of Sloterdijk s analysis 
of mass-medial mediocrity and his strategic use of intimacy for redefining the public and its conditions of 
possibility, see: van Tuinen, 2009b. 
38 Transgenesis is a kind of genetic modification in which DNA that is foreign to an existing species, the 
transgene, is introduced into the genome of a living organism of that species so that the organism might exhibit a 
new property and transmit that property to its offspring. 
39 Normally, the information flow in natural evolution is divided between processes of extracellular 
communication through selection, crossover and mutation and intracellular communication such as replication, 
transcription and translation.  
40
 This conception of languages is first and foremost influenced by Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, for whom 
language is gained not by letting oneself be disciplined by existing language games, since what counts is the 
flow of language, the flow of addressing speech, by which the speaker imposes binding appeals or vocations on 
those learning to speak. We are called to language through the imperatives of an addresses that we are being 
spoken to and through, hence speaking is always the passing on of evocations or imperatives, and passing on is 
continuous change. Cf. Sloterdijk s speech of thanks for the Sigmund Freud Preis für Wissenschaftliche Prosa. 
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principles of difference that dominate these discourses. It was also for this reason that 
Foucault, in The Order of Things (1966), introduced Nietzsche s Übermensch as an indication 
of the possibility that future humans will develop new discourses, in which the clouds of 
humanistic languages will dissolve and in which it is once more possible to think 41. It is in 
the same way that we should understand the sigh of relief which Sloterdijk writes about in 
his letter to Habermas, the main protagonist of the philosophical generation preceding his 
own. What he is looking for is the possibility of a radical autobiography (1988: 48ff) and a 
poetical resistance to metaphysical and technocratic reflexes of Humanolatrie. (2001b: 224, 
233, 365) His anthropo-monstrology is therefore inseparable from a postmodern humour 
(365) or cybernetic irony (2001b: 126) which treats, in anthropological form, of the trans-
anthropological content of the latest history of power. (368) For Sloterdijk the concept of 
humanity ultimately means nothing but the art of creating transitions. 42 (365) It is no longer 
a moral, but a poetical concept.  
References  
Alliez, Eric, 2001, Nietzsche, or, The Parting of the Waters , transl. Alberto Toscano, in: Pli.  
Warwick Journal of Philosophy, 11, 32-5. 
Alliez, Eric, 2007, Living Hot, Thinking Coldly: An Interview with Peter Sloterdijk , in:  
Cultural Politics 3 (3), 307-26. 
Ansell-Pearson, Keith (2009) The Transfiguration of existence and sovereign life: Sloterdijk  
and Nietzsche on posthuman and superhuman futures. In: Society and Space, 27(1), 
139-156. 
Arendt, Hannah, 1958, The Human Condition, New York: Double Day Anchor Books. 
Bordeleau, Erik, 2007, Entre biopouvoir plastique et biopolitique de la sélection: Sloterdijk  
penseur de l anthropogénétique , Altérités 4 (2), 92-107. 
Deleuze, Gilles & Guattari, Félix, 1994, What is Philosophy?, transl. H. Tomlinson & G.  
Burchill, London/NY: Verso. 
Derrida, Jacques, 1997, Of Grammatology, transl. G. C. Spivak, Baltimore/London: The John  
Hopkins University Press. 
Derrida, Jacques, 1982, Margins of Philosophy, transl. A. Bass, Chicago/Sussex: The  
University of Chicago 
                                                
41
 Foucault, 2001, The Order of Things, Routledge, 373, see also Foucault s remarks on infinite writing. 
42 For a further elaboration of this art in terms of Foucault s concept of ethopoiesis, see Bordeleau, 2007 
 23
Derrida, Jacques, 1979, Spurs. Nietsche s Styles, transl. B. Harlow, University of Chicago  
Press. 
Derrida, Jacques, 1988, Politics of Friendship, transl. G. Collins, London/NY: Verso. 
Foucault, Michel, 2001, The Order of Things, Routledge. 
Günther, Gotthard, 1963, Das Bewusstsein der Maschinen, Baden-Baden/Krefeld: Agis- 
Verlag. 
Habermas, Jürgen, 1991, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: Inquiry into a  
Category of Bourgeois Society, transl. T. Burger, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen, 1987, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, transl. F.G. Lawrence, 1987,  
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen, 1999, Post vom bösen Geist , Die Zeit, 38/1999, p. 28. 
Heidegger, Martin (2000). Über den Humanismus. Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio  
Klostermann. 
Heidegger, Martin, 1954, Wissenschaft und Besinnung , in: Vorträge und Aufsätze, Klett- 
Cotta, 41ff. 
Heidegger, Martin, 1977, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trals.  
William Lovitt, New York: Harper and Row Publishers.  
Heidegger, Martin, 1989, Beiträge zur Philosophie, Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann. 
Kay, Lili, 2000, Who Wrote the Book of Life?, Chicago/London: Stanford University Press. 
Kirschner, Marc W. & Gerhart, John C., 2005, The Plausibility of Life. Resolving Darwin's  
Dilemma, Yale University Press. 
Moss, Lenny, 2004, What Genes Can t Do, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Nennen, Heinz-Ulrich, 2003, Philosophie in Echtzeit. Die Sloterdijk-Debatte: Chronik einer  
Inszenierung: Über Metaphernfolgenabschätzung, die Kunst des Zuschauers und die  
Pathologie der Diskurse, Königshausen & Neumann. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1999, Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden, ed. .  
Giorgio Colli und Mazzimo Montinari. München: De Gruyter/dtv. 
Oosterling, Henk, 2007, Interest and Excess of Modern Man s Radical Mediocrity 
Rescaling Sloterdijk s Grandiose Aesthetic Strategy , in: Cultural Politics, 3 (3),  
357-80. 
Oyama, Susan, 2000, The Ontogeny of Information, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Roof, Judith, 2007, The Poetics of DNA, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota UP. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1978, Literatur und Lebenserfahrung. Autobiographien der Zwanziger  
Jahre, München: Carl Hanser Verlag. 
 24
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1987a, Critique of Cynical Reason, University of Minnesota Press, transl. by  
Michael Eldred and with a foreword by Andreas Huyssen. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1985, Der Zauberbaum. Die Entstehung der Psychoanalyse im Jahr 1785,  
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1990, The Thinker on Stage. Nietzsche s Materialism, transl. J. O. Daniel,  
University of Minnesota Press. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1987b, Kopernikanische Mobilmachung und ptolemaïsche Abrüstung.  
Ästhetischer Versuch, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1988, Zur Welt kommen  zur Sprache kommen. Frankfurter Vorlesungen,  
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1989, Eurotaoismus. Zur Kritik einer politischen Kinetik, Frankfurt a.M.:  
Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1993a, Im selben Boot. Versuch über die Hyperpolitik, Frankfurt a.M.:  
Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1993b, Medien-Zeit. Drei gegenwartsdiagnostische Versuche, Stuttgart:  
Cantz. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1994, Weltfremdheit. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1996, Selbstversuch. Ein Gespräch mit Carlos Oliveira, München: Carl  
Hanser Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1998, Der starke Grund zusammen zu sein, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp  
Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1998, Sphären I. Blasen, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1999, Sphären II. Globen, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 1999, Die Kritische Theorie ist tot , in: Die Zeit, 37/1999, pp. 35f. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 2007, Living Hot, Thinking Coldly , interview with Peter Sloterdijk by  
Éric Alliez, in: Cultural Politics, 3/2007. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 2000, Regels voor het mensenpark. Kroniek van een debat, Amsterdam:  
Boom. 
Sloterdijk Peter, 2000, Die Verachtung der Massen. Versuch über Kulturkämpfe in der  
modernen Gesellschaft, Franktfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter & Heinrichs, Hans-Jürgen, 2001a, Die Sonne und der Tod. Dialogische  
Untersuchungen, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 2001b, Nicht Gerettet. Versuche über Heidegger, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp  
Verlag. 
 25
Sloterdijk, Peter, 2001c, Über die Verbesserung der guten Nachricht. Nietzsche s fünftes  
Evangelium, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 2004, Sphären III. Schäume, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 2005a, Im Weltinnenraum des Kapitals. Für eine philosophische Theorie der  
Globalisierung, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 2005b, Atmospheric Politics , in: Latour, B. & Weibel, P., 2005 Making  
Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy, The MIT Press, 944ff. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 2007, What Happened in the 20th Century? En Route to a Critique of  
Extremist Reason , in: Cultural Politics, 3/2007 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 2006, Derrida, un Egyptien : Le problème de la pyramide juive,  transl. O.  
Mannoni, Paris: Maren Sell Editeurs. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 2006, Zorn und Zeit. Politisch-psychologischer Versuch, Frankfurt a.M.:  
Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 2009a, Rules for the Human Zoo: a response to the Letter on Humanism ,  
transl. Mary Varney Rorty, in: Society and Space 27, 12-28. 
Sloterdijk, Peter, 2009b, Philosophische Temperamente. Von Platon bis Foucault, München:  
Diederichs. 
Tuinen, Sjoerd van, 2006, Peter Sloterdijk. Ein Profil, Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink Verlag. 
Tuinen, Sjoerd van, 2007, Critique Beyond Resentment. An Introduction to Peter  
Sloterdijk s Jovial Modernity , in: Cultural Politics, 3 (3), 275-306. 
S. van Tuinen (2009a) Air Conditioning Spaceship Earth: Peter Sloterdijk's Ethico-Aesthetic  
Paradigm. In: Society and Space, 27(1), pp. 105-18. 
S. van Tuinen (2009b) Breath of Relief. Peter Sloterdijk and the Politics of the Intimate. In:  
D. Hoens, & S. Jottkandt & G. Buelens (eds.) Tickle your Catastrophe: On Borders, 
Cuts and Edges in Contemporary Theory. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 53-
81. 
This document was created with Win2PDF available at http://www.win2pdf.com.
The unregistered version of Win2PDF is for evaluation or non-commercial use only.
This page will not be added after purchasing Win2PDF.
